PORTUGAL AND PEACEBUILDING: COLONIAL MEMORIES AND CONTEMPORARY CROSSROADS

João Portugal Vieira

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### ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP countries</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTL</td>
<td>Commissioner for the Support of the East-Timorese Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA-C</td>
<td>Centre for Information and Documentation Anti-Colonial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDAC</td>
<td>Intervention Centre for the Development of Amilcar Cabral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Language Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIEI</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAD</td>
<td>Portuguese Institute for the Support of Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRI</td>
<td>Portuguese Institute for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>University Solidarity Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>Peace Studies Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>NGDOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental development organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAMPA</td>
<td>Portuguese Support of Peace Missions in Africa Programme</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Indicative Cooperation Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReCAMP</td>
<td>Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Third United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPBC</td>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR 1325</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Portugal lies at the periphery of Europe. This geographic reality also portrays the role of the country inside the European institutions. Such an intermediary function between core and periphery countries is especially relevant in the area of development aid and peacebuilding.

The most relevant feature of Portuguese policies concerning peacebuilding is, in fact, the absence of any autonomous importance allotted to peacebuilding. It only appears as a by-product of development aid policies. Within this historical context, the development of case-by-case strategies has been the dominant path followed by the government and civil society organisations (CSOs).

Dramatic events unfolding in former colonies led to peacebuilding policies in the 1990s. This ad hoc rationale still prevails over any sort of organised strategy. Attempts to make a coherent choice on supporting peacebuilding and human security from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, or MNE) and the Portuguese Institute for the Support of Development (IPAD), the governmental agency that supports international development policies, have been undermined by a lack of solid communication and coordination channels within governmental institutions and with Portuguese civil society. Above all, however, this support has been hindered by a lack of appropriate funding, which would have allowed for better practical results.

In recent years, Portugal has made several pronouncements on development. A Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation published in 2005, for instance, is understood by the government to be a seminal step in restructuring the country’s development policies. It is also meant to have an impact on the relevance of peacekeeping, human security, gender and security issues, and on the improvement of development aid tools.

Nonetheless, the lack of appropriate funding is constraining the advancement of peacebuilding policies and Official Development Assistance (ODA), specifically the goal to reach EU ODA goals by 2015. With limited resources, priorities must be set, and ODA for countries with historical and linguistic ties to Portugal take precedence over others. Historically, three cases led to this situation and to an emphasis on state-building, helping to mould the current aid and peace efforts as mostly directed to three Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste.

Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste, together with São Tomé and Principe, are still regarded as fragile states and – like other former Portuguese colonies suffering from internal conflicts or the erosion of state power – display traces of continuity with the countries’ colonial past, with their imported Portuguese judicial systems and official institutional frameworks.

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2 The EU made specific commitments to achieve the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, which included to: ‘set new intermediate targets for growth in official aid budgets by 2010 with a view to achieving the overall target of 0.7% of the gross national income (GNI) by 2015; speed up reforms that will improve the quality of aid; rethink the way that the EU, through its own model of sustainable development and its internal and external policies, influences the conditions for development; [and] ensure that Africa is the number one beneficiary of these new approaches and seize new opportunities for partnership between the two continents’. Following these commitments would require that the Member States ‘set new minimum individual targets of 0.51% ODA/GNI (0.17% for new Member States) to be achieved by 2010, raising the EU collective average to 0.56%. This commitment would generate an additional €20 billion by 2010, enabling the target of 0.7% of GNI set by the UN to be reached by 2015’. See a full briefing on these goals at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12533.htm.
The priority given to state-building is common to all levels of Portuguese post-conflict efforts in so-called fragile countries. It is also based on different and many times contradictory official lines, such as the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) focus on state security, in parallel with the MNE’s focus since 2006 on peacebuilding and human security, and the altruistic vision of non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs). This priority extends to the non-Portuguese-speaking beneficiaries of Portuguese ODA, but the relevance of these countries in terms of funding and project developments, or in comparison to funding and projects in former colonies, is always marginal.

**Keywords**: Portugal, Peacebuilding, Human Security, ODA, Africa, Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau, Angola
INTRODUCTION

Due to its semi-peripheral position, Portugal’s strategy and status in the framework of international peacebuilding and aid policies in general, is characterised by: a) its subordination to the international agenda in terms of aid and peacebuilding principles; b) an emergencies-based operational strategy; and c) a low profile regarding financial contributions and agenda-setting capabilities.

Even if it has no autonomous peacebuilding strategy, Portugal has been trying to adapt to, align with and reproduce international policies and practices, mirroring recent shifts and evolutions in the international agenda.

One sign of this trend is the prioritisation of the state failure agenda in Portuguese policies regarding its traditional partners. The inclusion of human security concerns in the Strategic Vision, referred to earlier, is also an attempt to express a new vision for development policies in Portugal, one more open to the issues brought by failed states, peacebuilding, stabilisation and transitional policies, or gender issues. But implementing the document’s proposals is proving to be more difficult than expected. This is the result of chronic under-funding on the one hand, and communication and organisational problems plaguing the state and civil society on the other.

With some of its main ODA recipients labelled as “fragile states” (Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Timor-Leste), Portugal takes part in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, Portugal acts as a “facilitator”, contributing to the identification of priority areas in order to make aid more effective in the country.

Portuguese cooperation, therefore, officially recognises the importance of changing its policies, either through participation in bilateral and multilateral debates on peacebuilding, or through the introduction of human security concerns in projects and programmes. In practical terms, the question to ask is to what extent Portugal (and the entire donor community) will effectively adjust aid mechanisms to these recent concerns.

Past experiences show that Portuguese peacebuilding actions and policies are usually the result of an emergency situation, in countries with cultural and historical ties, and are carried out on a case-by-case basis.

The low profile of the country explains the lack of funding for public policies directed towards development and sustainable peace, but it is also a consequence of the this low level of funding.

To better understand what influences current Portuguese efforts and priorities in sustainable peace and official development aid, we will begin with an overview of the current country context, followed by a historical approach and mapping of past and current civil society activities and government thoughts and actions on these issues.
METHODOLOGY

To assess existing policies and practices, and report on historical changes in such policies, the author consulted official documents from IPAD and the MNE, together with an extensive review of the bibliography, articles, working papers and interviews available at the Peace Studies Research Group (Núcleo de Estudos Para a Paz, or NEP) of the Centre for Social Studies (CES).3

Several interviews with NGDO staff were used, resulting in relevant assessments on human security, relations between the state and civil society, how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) view their roles, as well as their main grievances and hopes for the future. Informal talks with government officials were also conducted.

Documents from multilateral organisations like the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), several EU institutions, the OECD etc., have also been taken into account.

Finally, informal discussions were held with specialists in the peacebuilding and development aid fields, in order to get a better sense of the priorities for data gathering and to acquire confirmation of the first batch of fact findings.

3 The NEP is part of the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra (Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra), Portugal.
PORTUGUESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The existing plans to reach EU ODA spending targets for 2015 are politically tied to several pronouncements. Yet, budgetary realities – among other things – paint a different picture. Portuguese efforts at meeting the convergence criteria for the Euro mean that the government needs to tighten its budget in order to remain at an acceptable level of public debt. ODA is thus becoming one of the many areas where Portugal needs to tightly control its expenditure. Consequently, funds for ODA remain low in relative and absolute terms, with OECD-DAC recommendations and EU goals for ODA clouded in budgetary obstacles. ODA needs to be stepped up in relative terms in order to come closer to those targets. This requires a concerted effort by Portugal.

FIGURE 1: OECD NET ODA AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (2007)


Even if the official explanation for aid budgetary restraints is related to expenditure control, other structural explanations must also be stressed, such as how development aid has traditionally taken a second seat to other kinds of external policy instruments, such as foreign investment and non-ODA cooperation instruments. This trend is aggravated by civil society's lack of support for policies that do not bring quick and national benefits, which is something that only changes in the event of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Even so, the Portuguese government is trying to establish some peacebuilding tools in the field of ODA. The national development agency IPAD, for instance, runs Portuguese ODA programmes. In December 2005, the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database devised a new sub-sector4 for funding and supporting aid in peacebuilding.
Portuguese ODA programmes, based on DAC-CRS recommendations. ‘Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security’ was added - within the governmental sector ‘Government and Civil Society’ - to the sectors taken into account by Portuguese ODA for the first time, in an attempt to open a new chapter in ODA and peacebuilding policies. In reality, a specific budget line was never set up and the judgement of the 2006 OECD Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD)-DAC peer review document still stands:

Nine of the top ten recipients of Portuguese aid, including five out of six priority countries, are considered to be fragile or conflict-affected states. Portugal has not articulated a global policy on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and fragile states.⁵

To respond to this situation, the government brought these issues to the forefront with its Strategic Vision.⁶ Produced by IPAD, it is a well-intentioned document aimed at conceptualising Portuguese political and institutional cooperation, bringing more attention to issues like failed states, peacebuilding, stabilisation and transitional policies, and gender issues. As in most discussions about public policies towards peacebuilding, the implementation of the Strategic Vision’s proposals is proving to be more difficult than expected, a result of the aforementioned lack of funding, and the communication and organisational problems that plague the state and civil society relations.

With limited resources and an expression of both its semi-peripheral position in Europe and its colonial legacy, ODA to former Portuguese colonies takes precedence over assistance to all other countries according to official rules on co-financing NGDO projects.

Many of the current projects developed by Portuguese NGDOs – which follow the same geographical funding distribution as the government – take place in countries where the consolidation of peace is a priority. Portugal is a country where the creation of CSOs is ‘far from having the strength and representation it has in other countries, including in the southern parts of Europe’.⁷ Yet, there are women and men that have moved into active (and activist) work on development cooperation issues, which the 42 very heterogeneous groups – far from the 3,000 groups that exist in neighbouring Spain – that constitute the Development NGOs Platform, and the work of the research centres and university institutes, are testament to.

It is clear when speaking of ODA projects that Portuguese priority is in the country’s former colonies, and in Africa in particular, as we can see displayed in Figure 2 and Table 1:

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**FIGURE 2: BY REGION**

![Pie chart showing ODA by region](chart.png)

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top ten recipients of gross ODA (USD million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sao Tome and Principe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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That commitment is also apparent in official pronouncements, such as the Portuguese support for the UNPBC, where it pushes for actions that again prioritise the former colonies. In comparison, the flows of funds to and development of projects for non-former colonies and non-African countries is marginal to non-existent.

Historically, three cases helped mould Portugal's current aid and peace efforts, and set the priority in the direction of the Portuguese-speaking countries of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste.

State and civil society actors first started to forge partnerships on peacemaking and development issues in post-conflict Angola in the early 1990s. The Portuguese government strongly pushed for both a peace process and reconciliation between the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), culminating in the Bicesse Agreement in 1991 and free elections in 1992. Both a desire to obtain international political recognition of Portugal as a relevant actor in the region, and a desire to "fix" the legacy of colonisation and problems experienced following decolonisation, fuelled an intense movement of frenetic activity and displacement of resources to post-conflict Angola. Even with the reignition of conflict and all the hardships experienced since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, the Portuguese remained in Angola not only as part of successive UN peace missions – the second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), third UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM III) and UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) – but also through all sorts of tools tailored to support a lasting and sustainable peace. These include ODA, a diversified presence of NGOs throughout the country and technical-military cooperation. Between 1999 and 2006, bilateral Portuguese ODA to Angola totalled some €687,618,816 – although €575,891,931 of this comprised of debt relief in 2004. Between 2003 and 2007, NGDOs operating in Angola were granted €3,099,614.

Guinea-Bissau is another one of the main beneficiaries of Portuguese ODA and NGDO activity, with particular focus on the education and health sectors, though significant cooperation-related flows also went toward civil society and the stabilisation of institutions (see Table 2).

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>507,354</td>
<td>590,288</td>
<td>1,219,485</td>
<td>563,371</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,347,181</td>
<td>704,432</td>
<td>858,492</td>
<td>192,865</td>
<td>872,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,304,150</td>
<td>9,766,622</td>
<td>10,874,464</td>
<td>11,761,439</td>
<td>11,517,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government and civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals ODA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Portugal has concentrated its peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau on state-building (institution building, training etc.) in areas such as justice and security reforms. This follows from its engagement with the OECD-DAC process on monitoring aid in fragile states, Portugal having assumed a leading role in setting up the state-building framework as the first step towards peacebuilding. The focus has been on state institutions, with only a few actions supporting civil society.

When the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding in his An Agenda for Peace as, ‘action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict’, it almost seems that he was evoking the Portuguese efforts in Timor-Leste, the most relevant case in joint actions for peacebuilding from the last decade in the Portuguese context.

Timor-Leste is indeed an impressive example of the use of extensive resources and collaboration by governmental and non-governmental institutions in Portugal for peacebuilding purposes. Not only did the traditional

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8 For more information about the UNPBC, see http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/.
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing approaches have the support of the Portuguese government, but a joint effort to consolidate the conditions for a lasting peace were also carried out by the government, the civil society and, in this case, the private sector.

In the period after 1999, the government-appointed Commissioner for the Support of the East-Timorese Transition (CATTL) was created to put forward the ambitious plan to coordinate the government, CSO and private sectors’ joint efforts in emergency humanitarian assistance, as well as rebuilding and development efforts, and promoting a stable and peaceful new state. Portuguese banks went to Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, to help create a new financial system – one with liquidity – and to insure payments urgently needed to help stabilise the economy and welfare of the population; telecommunications companies helped create and/or amend networks where needed; and teachers and volunteers helped rebuild the educational system – to this day, they have a large presence there. NGOs of all sorts also went out to Timor-Leste, first for the rebuilding process, and then to solidify aid and peacebuilding efforts.

Since 2002, rather than holding exceptional status in the country’s ODA framework, Timor-Leste has been a peer for all other beneficiaries of Portuguese ODA. It still remains a priority country though. The commitment towards Timor-Leste remains strong in many sections of Portuguese society and ODA keeps flowing. Between 1999 and 2006, Portuguese ODA to Timor-Leste totalled around €381,288,063.

Given the crises these three countries have historically experienced, it is fair to assume that the recent history of Portuguese ODA has taken into account more than just international political recognition, helping beneficiaries to obtain human security, as defined by the Commission on Human Security as ‘political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that, when combined, give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity’. Yet these efforts were also the product of dramatic circumstances which needed urgent action and do not correlate with a coherent posture in defence of the development of a human security framework. In the case of the MoD, which coordinates UN peace missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and the technical-military cooperation with African nations, several speeches help to reinforce the feeling that state security issues are the main concern in terms of ODA, motivated in particular by the issues of terrorism and access to sources of hydrocarbons.

There seems to be more sensibility towards the importance of coherent strategies to develop human security policies from the MNE and IPAD, and a renewed attention towards questions pertaining to fragile states, as we can see in the Strategic Vision:

Portugal shall take a particular interest in all initiatives concerning support for the so-called “fragile” or “failed” states, as well as in activities aimed at promoting post-conflict stabilisation and development.

In fact, the existence of “fragile states” is one of the major threats in the era of globalisation – not only for the populations of these states, but also for many people in other parts of the world. The nature of the problems which “fragile states” face requires a coordinated multilateral and bilateral approach. Portugal will support multilateral initiatives aimed at making the world a safer place.

These proclamations, and the existence of a sub-chapter devoted to human security in the aforementioned official document, have thus far not produced many practical developments. The general feeling gained from NEP/CES interviews with NGDO staff is that human security (and we would add peacebuilding) is considered more of a buzzword for NGOs, which still focus on the general ‘improvement of living conditions’. Two different interviewees raised the question of a lack of strategic vision while dealing with human security issues and the need to set better operational standards to implement the innovative – for Portugal – ideas established in the document. Still, there was a renewed push during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007 for human security issues, which, according to another NGDO member, was the first time most NGOs ever took notice of this issue.

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11 An example, from many, can be found at http://www.portugal.gov.pt/Portal/Print.aspx?guid={22FC85D0-16B7-4C93-8446-EF08DCCB2892} (Portuguese).
A final note regarding gender issues, ‘looking at relations, divisions, differences and inequalities between and among women, girls, boys and men’\(^{13}\) is a vitally important consideration for ODA, given that women are the majority of the population in the target countries for cooperation. Yet gender issues are doubly important in situations where the consolidation of a healthy sustainable environment for peace is at stake. Reading NGDO mission statements and talking to their staff, there is a feeling that this dimension is understood, but has yet to be translated into practical programming on the ground.

A few exceptions are the interesting research being developed by NEP/CES, mainly on women’s roles in peacebuilding, with a special emphasis on discourses and practices in conflict, non-violence and re-conceptualisation of the notion of power and authority. Also relevant are the women’s organisations’ empowerment programmes of the University Solidarity Institute (Instituto de Solidariedade Universitária, or ISU) in Portuguese-speaking nations.

Gender issues are mentioned several times in IPAD’s *Strategic Vision*, and were also raised during the author’s interviews with government officials. It seems, therefore, that Portuguese officials are awake to this particular issue. The official line is that:

> We now know that policies which take into account gender equality tend to have more important multiplier effects for society, besides being also intrinsically fairer, and this aspect shall be considered when deciding on the support to be given. [...] In this respect, Portuguese development cooperation gives a clear contribution towards achieving the purposes of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and of the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.\(^{14}\)

In practice, however, this is one field that is still far from in the mainstream, and one that requires more attention, as recommended by the DAC. It needs to be given more importance in programmes in fragile states and countries coming out of conflicts and social unrest, mainly by a greater focus on the programme protocols developed by IPAD and greater political will being invested in it. The government asked for expert opinions on the best way to tackle the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, but with no practical results so far.

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PORTUGUESE APPROACHES TO MULTILATERAL PEACEBUILDING

On the multilateral side, official commitment to peacebuilding is more noticeable in times of crisis in Portuguese-speaking countries, or in symbolic pronouncements, like Portuguese support for the UNPBC. Already in 2004, the then Prime Minister Durão Barroso proposed the following to ECOSOC:

[...]In two recent instances, the ECOSOC, sharing this concern with conflict prevention, created ad hoc working groups to reinforce, in the sphere of its mandate, the international efforts in Guinea-Bissau and in Burundi through the development of adequate nation-building and development strategies. [...] To this effect, the Secretary-General, in his Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (A/55/98-S/2001/574) encouraged the Security Council (Recommendation No. 3) to consider innovative mechanisms, such as establishing a subsidiary organ, an ad hoc informal group or other informal arrangement to discuss prevention cases on a continuing basis. [...] The creation of this subsidiary organ should not be postponed anymore.15

With the example of Guinea-Bissau fresh in their mind, the Portuguese government put all of its institutional support behind the UNPBC. Angola and Guinea-Bissau are now important members of the UNPBC, which has allocated US$6 million in funding for an interim peacebuilding priority plan for Guinea-Bissau.16

There are some efforts being carried out to develop the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidades dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, or CPLP) capabilities, so as to enable it to play a more relevant role in cooperation and peacebuilding issues when needed. That is the idea behind the official government line, again expressed in the Strategic Vision:

The CPLP is a privileged concertation [sic] forum, and the Portuguese language is a vehicle for peace and democracy. Belonging to the Portuguese-speaking world is thus not just a question of history, but rather a challenge for the future. This historical background must make it possible to build up a modern vision of Portugal in the world.17

While today some efforts are being carried out in establishing the CPLP as a platform to encourage cooperation between equal partners, we are still at a very early stage in this development. Some recent moves by the CPLP to try to moderate the last Timor-Leste crisis are a sign that the current status quo could change. It indicated that the development of a Portuguese-speaking community which understands the importance of fully incorporating peacebuilding as a means of improving the security of citizens and states, the rule of law and economic well-being, may become viable in the future.

What has had a more immediate impact on Portuguese peacebuilding commitments, however, is the country’s participation in the EU. For instance, Portugal participates in EU Council working groups related to cooperation on development, like the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group, the Food Aid Group and the Development

Cooperation Group, which sets the main guidelines for EU development activities. Portugal also has a presence on the financing committees of the European Commission, like the European Development Fund (EDF) Committee – which is mainly focused on ACP countries, the Human Rights Committee and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Committee – which mainly focuses on African countries.

Through the years, Portugal has developed efforts in accordance with the recommendations of the 2000 Cairo Summit, organised a new EU-Africa Summit in 2007 and established bridges between the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) member states and the EU. Portugal has gathered enough experience and know-how in post-conflict situations and development aid to help in building capacity of EU structures and personnel.

On the military side, Portugal’s technical-military cooperation programmes are geared toward ‘good governance and sustainable development’. Besides the bilateral programmes that prioritise Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal is also involved in trilateral efforts carried out under the Euro-French programme, the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (ReCAMP), as well as participating in EU initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) banner, including the African Ownership programme. In addition, Portugal has adopted its own Support of Peace Missions in Africa Program (PAMPA) to promote synergies within the EU. But all these efforts appear to come back to the aforementioned prioritisation of countries with linguistic and historical ties to Portugal, in the sense that the EU framework acts as a multilateral extension of existing bilateral priorities.

Also important is the Portuguese participation in peace missions under the UN banner, which nevertheless displays figures that are negligible in international standards, as one can see on the UN lists of contributors.

The technical-military cooperation is seen by the government as a method by which to “subsidise”, directly and indirectly, the ODA and to contribute to achieving the targets set under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Portugal also has several contingents of police and paramilitary forces in countries across the world, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Iraq, but the main contribution of these forces has been towards cooperation efforts to establish local police forces, yet again, in former colonies like Timor-Leste.

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CIVIL SOCIETY: PAST AND PRESENT

With the April Revolution in 1974 came a new period in the international positioning of Portugal and profound socio-political changes. A strong feeling of solidarity and the will to reach out to other peoples gained an unprecedented momentum.

A good example is the creation and history of what was then called the Centre for Information and Documentation Anti-Colonial (Centro de Informação e Documentação Anti-Colonial, or CIDA-C) in Lisbon, Portugal. CIDA-C was primarily concerned with the third “D” in the Movimento das Forças Armadas’ (the Armed Forces Movement which seized power in Portugal in the April, or Carnation Revolution) democracy, development and decolonisation programme. First created as a gathering of experiences and will among progressive Catholics and other likeminded individuals, CIDA-C aimed to put pressure on the authorities of the time to speed up national recognition of the right to self-determination and independence of Portuguese colonies. This goal was achieved with decolonisation, with the exception of Timor-Leste, where military intervention by Indonesia crushed the country’s bid for independence. CIDA-C has since been renamed the Intervention Centre for the Development of Amilcar Cabral (CIDAC) and reconfigured its action toward development education and development cooperation. From the ‘Weekend for Militant Cooperation’ in 1976 and developing a Documentation Centre for Cooperation and Anti-colonial Solidarity in the 1980s, to establishing ties on documentation with the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and being at the forefront of the creation of the Portuguese NGDOs Platform in 1985 (with the support of the European Commission), CIDAC is an example of the Portuguese civil society’s capacity to face the issues of international cooperation and helping toward the empowerment of former colonial populations.

The Platform itself was constituted by thirteen associations in March 1985, and became a hub for cooperation efforts within civil society in Portugal. In the words of João Gomes Cravinho, to the ‘internal push that came from a progressive and dynamic vision of the role of “associativism” in the development of the country, an external push was added: the accession to the European Communities’, and thus access to European funds. Although its resilience in helping out the development aid efforts and empowerment of the now independent populations was never put into question, the Platform only gained legal status in 1999, a sure sign of the frailties and operational problems among civil society cooperation organisations. The main focus of the Platform is on the promotion of sustainable and integrated development models, in strict respect of human rights and to follow and influence the development, execution and evaluation of development and cooperation policies at a national and international level; so far it has displayed a lack of will (or awareness) to develop lines of action towards human security and peacebuilding policies.

However, the recent past has been characterised by an absence of dialogue and coordination mechanisms, and even by active mistrust and open conflict between the government and some NGOs. Efforts to optimise the channels of communication have been carried out since 2004, but a lot of work is still required in order to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation between the Platform and government.

Aid to and through Portuguese NGOs is not significant, with Portugal being one of smallest funders in Europe (three percent of total aid given). In terms of sector-based distribution of NGO projects, the main sector in

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2006 was education (with 28 percent of aid), followed by health (24 percent) and the fight against poverty (14 percent). Governance was the sector with the fewest projects (three percent), contrary to what happens at the level of state cooperation.23

There is also some mistrust on the part of NGOs about policies that link development and security, because of the preconception that they could help out state security agendas – which could hinder NGO efforts on the ground. Furthermore, most NGOs comprise mainly of volunteers, who join development cooperation programmes with an altruistic motivation, so there is still a long path to go until all the NGOs fully awaken to the need of supporting human security and peacebuilding policies.

However, development cooperation and peacebuilding have increasingly become important subjects within universities and research centres during the last decade. Their role is recognised as of major importance by the government, which chooses to highlight their greatest virtues and achievements in the Strategic Vision:

- ‘Specialized advanced education (bachelor's degrees, master's degrees, post-graduate studies, PhDs, post-doctoral studies and specialization courses), thereby helping to create knowledge in Portugal and in the developing countries […]

- The creation of know-how on development cooperation matters (research into matters concerning development studies). This research should contribute to create knowledge about different realities and to devise common strategies and technical and indicative solutions for the problems of different countries.

- The creation and capacity-building of universities or similar training structures in partner countries. […]

- Forum for debate on the principles and methods of development cooperation.

- Development cooperation agents who design and implement their own projects; and technical assistance to the implementation of development cooperation projects, by cooperating with other institutions for this purpose.24

In 1980, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, or IEEI) was created, developing through the years a range of studies and activities in the fields of cooperation, security, international stability and democratic transition; the Portuguese Institute for International Relations (Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, or IPRI) researches all subjects in international relations, and one can find relevant information on peacebuilding processes, particularly in their African Section; also very relevant has been the role of the NEP/CES, created in 2002, with a trajectory of research on the fields of structural prevention strategies, such as development cooperation and post-conflict rehabilitation, with specific consideration of the different actors involved and a critical overview of the strategies of post-war capacity-building, women's role in peacebuilding, and international disarmament efforts.

CONCLUSION

Although some steps have been taken in the field of technical and military cooperation efforts towards peacebuilding in international frameworks – namely within the EU – Portugal perceives ODA as more of a bilateral affair, in the sense of participating in international efforts guided mainly by their own agenda, which places Portuguese-speaking countries and other regions with strong cultural ties as a priority.

There is political commitment in Portugal for trying to meet EU goals for ODA. The EU has undertaken to provide ODA worth 0.7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015, with an interim joint target of 0.56 percent by 2010. The latter includes individual targets of 0.51 percent for the longest-standing Member States, including Portugal, and a target of 0.17 percent for the most recent Member States. Whether, with Portuguese budgetary concerns, this commitment will be carried out to its fullest extent, is something that remains to be seen.

But regardless of what the future will bring, Portugal clearly has the know-how and capacities to develop policies capable of meshing development cooperation and peacebuilding with EU partners in a constructive and collaborative atmosphere. The priority will remain the Portuguese-speaking world and ACP countries in EU projects. The main obstacle to positive developments in these fields, however, appears to come from a chronic lack of appropriate funding and the need to develop awareness among civil society of peacebuilding.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• The government should continue the shift to more results-driven policies, with better incentive mechanisms towards budget and support rewards for successful programmes.

• The IPAD development of cooperation clusters should take into account civil society in target countries and the EU structures in place.

• The EU goal to provide ODA worth 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015 still seems distant, with budget limitations restricting those efforts, rather than expanding them – something the government needs to address.

• The government and civil society should expand and correctly apply the ongoing projects toward security sector reform in target countries, giving even greater emphasis to the reintegration of former combatants.

• All the main actors of ODA and peacebuilding policies in Portugal should better identify new causes for mobilisation towards violence, like religious or group identity issues, and act accordingly on the prevention of violence caused by such phenomena.

• On the government and civil society sides, a more practical and less rhetorical approach towards gender issues in post-conflict situations is needed, as well as more relevance to such issues in the ODA projects’ review framework.

• Portugal should better support those local groups determined to tackle the problems raised by disarming populations and to destroy the small weapons caches in circulation in fragile or post-crisis states, and support future efforts of the EU in such matters.

• Portugal also needs to reinforce its current projects aimed at ensuring better availability of justice and proximity-level security policies in target countries.

• Working with the appropriate groups inside the EU, the government and civil society should develop more youth-oriented policies, as young people are a group particularly vulnerable in age-stratified societies where they have fewer opportunities at their disposal, and are more likely to engage in conflicts and violence.

• Portugal should continue to extend its contribution to what should be the common goals of constructing a sustainable peace in post-conflict regions, and the enlargement of the role and participation of the EU in such matters, not only from a security point of view, but also clearly support the common values that have guided the EU since its inception.